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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE "NICK" KIRK,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )

Case N o .

870488

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH and its
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

]
]

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Were the plaintiff's injuries and did the cause of
action arise out of the incarceration of a prisoner at the Utah
State prison within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10
(j), or if so has the State of Utah waived the governmental
Immunity Act by insuring its self against such suits?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought against the State of Utah
and its Department of Corrections for injuries suffered by a
court bailiff who was shot during an attempted escape of
a felon at the Courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The facts of this matter, while not tried to the court are such
that there is no dispute as to them.
1.

One, Ronnie Lee Gardner, was a convicted felon who

had previously escaped from the custody of the Utah State

Prison while at the University of Utah hospital and while on
escape allegedly murdered a man in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Gardner was recaptured and returned to the Utah

State Prison to serve his time for the numerous serious
felonies that he had been previously convicted of.
3.

On April 2nd, 1985, Gardner in the company of two

prison guards was transported from the Utah State Prison at
Draper, Utah to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake
City, Utah to attend proceedings against him stemming from the
murder charge.
4.

Upon entering the 1st floor of the Metropolitan

Hall of Justice, with the two guards immediately to his rear,
Gardner was approached by a female

who passed

Gardner a

loaded firearm, whereupon the two guards who were with Gardner
immediately fled the scene and took cover behind a vehicle
which was in the parking area of the 1st floor. One of them
took one shot at Gardner which hit Gardner in the shoulder,
wounding him, but not seriously.
5.

Gardner,inside the 1st floor of the courthouse

then shot and killed an attorney in the clerk's sub-office
located on the 1st floor and shot and critically wounded the
plaintiff who was an unarmed court bailiff assigned to the
Third Judicial District Court.
6.

Several minutes later Gardner made his way to the

outside front of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice where he was
captured by law enforcement officers.
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7.

Subsequently the plaintiff brought this action

against the State of Utah and its Department of Corrections
claiming that the prison guards and the Department were
negligent, to which action the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss.
8.

The action which had been filed in the Third

Judicial District Court was removed to the Fourth Judicial
District due to the plaintiff being a court bailiff of the
Third Judicial District.
9.

Following the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the

Honorable Boyd L. Park rendered a written opinion dismissing
plaintiff's complaint under the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (j).
10.

From this order the plaintiff timely filed his

appeal to the Supreme Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The words "arises out of" and "incarcerated" as
used in the governmental immunity act must be read together.
This phrase was not intended to be a shield behind which the
State and its employees can, without regard to the safety or
property of the citizens of this State act with respect to the
conduct or control of persons who may be under its control and
custody. Further, Gardner was not "incarcerated" within the
meaning of the Statute at the time of the shooting of the
plaintiff.
The State by utilizing tax dollars to insure
itsself and its employees from conduct allegedly under one of

the exemptions of the governmental immunity Act has waived
such immunity.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE INJURIES TO THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT
ARISE OUT OF THE INCARCERATION OF RONNIE
LEE GARDENER. ALSO HE WAS NOT INCARCERATED
AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTING OF THE PLAINTIFF
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH
The Legislature of the State of Utah at the time that
it enacted the governmental immunity act made certain
exceptions to the waiver of governmental immunity which are
generally found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.
The pertinent exemption, to this case, is subsection
(j) which provides:
"63-30-10 (1) Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury:
(j) Arises out of the incarceration
of any person in any state prison, county,
or city jail or other place of legal
confinement;"
The issue of whether this section covers situations
when injury or damage arises due to the conduct of a
person who is in the custody of prison officials but who is
not physically in the prison

has been passed upon by

the Supreme Court of Utah before, but the issue should be
reexamined by the Court in light of new law and trends in
holding the State or its subdivisions accountable to those who
are injured or killed due to the negligence of the State or
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its subdivisions.

It is submitted that the wording of the whole statute
must be read together and not bifurcated thus "arises out of
the incarceration"

must be read as a complete phrase.

v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265 (Utah, 1986)

In Ward

the Court held

"We construe a statute on the assumption
that each term is used advisedly and that
the intent of the Legislature is revealed
in the use of the term in the context and
structure in which it is placed."
The word

"incarceration" cannot stand alone, so the fact that

Ronnie Lee Gardner was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison,
in

a technical sense, although not physically at the state

prison when the shooting took place, is without moment.
For the exemption under the governmental immunity act
to be applicable the negligent act complained of must occur
because it "arises out of" that incarceration.
Under the facts of this case, Gardner's incarceration
in the state prison had nothing to do with him being in the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice.

He was there because the

Constitution and the implementing statutes of Utah required
him to be present at all proceedings

against

him stemming

from the pending murder charge. Utah Constitution, Article 1,
§ 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-16; State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507,
51 P.2d 1052.
Case law attempting to interpret what is meant by the
words "arising out of" generally have held that there has to be
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some causal connection between arising out of and the injury
complained of.
Wyoming held in Johnson v. Rothwell, 87 P.2d 13 (Wyo.
1939) that the words "arising out of" may be used in the
sense of "growing out of" or "created by" or "brought into
being by".

There must be some connection between arising out

of and the cause of action. Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co.,
707 P.2d 1250 (Oregon App. 1985).
New Mexico in Gutierrez v. Artesia Public Schools,
583 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1978) held that the words relate to the
cause of the injury.
Arizona also applies a causation factor to the use
of "arises out of". Vanguard Insurance Company v. Cantrell
503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. App 1973). Accord:

Estate of Smith v.

Hearon, 424 P.2d 970 (Okla 1967).
Utah in an insurance case, Nat. Farmers U. Prop & Cas
Co.v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978)
stated:
"The term 'arising out of1 is ordinarily
understood to mean originating from,
incident to or connected with the item
in question."
It is submitted that Utah falls within the same camp as
the other western states who have passed upon this matter.
Applying these standards to the facts of the case
now before the Court it is submitted that there was no
causal connection of the incarceration of Gardner and the

shooting of the plaintiff.
Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in Epting v.
State of Utah, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976) pointed out that the
wording of Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 should be read carefully.
Justice Maughan stated that the exception to the governmental
immunity act found in sub-section (j)

was to:

" . . . prevent incarcerated persons
from disrupting the orderly administration
of governmental institutions where legal
confinement, for crime or offense, is
lawsuits by incarcerated persons, against
supervisory personnel. It has nothing
whatsoever to do with a third party not
even remotely connected with incarceration."
Justice Maughan continued on and observed:
"thus, it would seem the phrase could
only mean injuries arising while the
incarcerated person was in the prison,
or under direct control of the state,
while laboring on a public work."
Justice Crockett, who was on the majority side in Epting, three
years later in Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979)
made the observation that although sub section (j) prevents
a prisoner from bring suit against authorities "nevertheless
they should be dealt^with fairly and honestly."
Under the facts of this case, is the State dealing
with the wounded bailiff fairly and honestly?
In the instant case the State allowed a mad dog killer
to run amok in a public courthouse, killing and maiming as he
went, while the guards who allowed a woman to pass the killer
a gun cowered behind a vehicle having run from their charge
although they too were armed.
-7-

The Board of Corrections as well as the guards knew
of Gardner's escape tries and of his crimes which included
wanton killings

and other henious crimes against society.

There has to be a causal connection.

National Farmers

Union Property and Casualty Company v. Western Casualty and
Surety Company, 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978); Taggart v. Industrial
Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356 (1932).
It is respectfully

submitted that sub-section (j)

is only applicable where the prisoner is in the prison
under the control of the State.

and

This was pointed out

by the Court in Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978)
wherein the Court held:
"The plain meaning of the section
reflects a legislative intent to
retain sovereign immunity for any
injuries occuring while the incarcerated
person is in prison and under the control
of the state." (Emphasis mine)
It is submitted that

Madsen, Schmitt, and Epting all stand

for the proposition that the incarceration referred to in
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 (j) is while jLn prison not running
around a courthouse.
POINT TWO
THE MODERN TREND OF THE CASES IS
TO HOLD THE STATE ACCOUNTABLE FOR
NEGLIGENTLY HANDLING PRISIONERS
The Restatement of Law, Torts, 2d § 319 states:
"One who takes charge of a third person
whom he knows or should know to be likely
to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the third
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person to prevent him from doing such
harm."
The Comment to this section by the author states:
(a) The rule stated in this Section is
applicable to a sheriff or peace officer,
a jailer or warden of a penal institution. . ."
The trend in the nation over the last few years has
been to charge the governmental agency and the State with
liability where there has been negligent conduct in the
control of known dangerous convicts and prisoners. Ryan v.
State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982); Rum River Lumber Co v.
State, 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1979); Gibson v. United States,
(C.A., 1972) 457 F.2d 1391; Allentown State Hospital v. Gill,
88 Pa Comwlth 331, 488 A.2d 1211 (1985).
The Oregon Appellate Court in Christensen v. Elpley,
585 P.2d 419 (Or App. 1978) in holding the governmental
agency liable where a police officer was stabbed to death
and applying § 315, Restatement of Torts, 2d, stated:
"By undertaking to oversee incarcerated
individuals whose escape would pose a danger
to others, the defendant assumes a
responsibility which places her in a special
relationship with those persons who may be
harmed by negligent performance of her duties.
Whether that class includes the entire
general public, we need not decide; it
would include police officers who suffer
a special danger in relation to escapees."
Kansas has adopted the rule that the State and or its
governmental agencies are liable for the conduct of escapees
and prisoners.

Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, (Kansas, 1984);

-Q-

Beck v, Kansas University Foundation/ 580 F. Supp 527 (D.
Kansas 1984). This latter case cites § 319 of the Restatement
of Torts, 2d as authority.

Arizona reversed its previous

position of no liability, in the case of Ryan v. State,
Supra, holding that a cause of action was stated against the
State for the conduct of an escaped youthful offender who shot
the plaintiff with a shotgun. See: Annotation, 55 ALR3d 899.
This author has not found any Utah cases which have
cited the Restatement of Torts (Sections § 319 or § 315)
but the rationale of Little v. Utah State Div. of Family
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) gives credence to the
position that Utah adheres to the law and philosophy as
espoused by the Restatement.

The duty referred to has been

adopted by the Legislature in Utah Code Ann § 64-13-14
which provides:
"The department shall maintain and
operate prison facilities for the
custody of offenders who pose a
danger of serious bodily harm to
others, who cannot be controlled
in a less secure setting, or who
have engaged in persistent or serious
criminal conduct."
This position is further strengthened by

the Court's

holding in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1985).
The Idaho Supreme Court in a very long opinion,
Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755 (Idaho 1986), in citing
§ 319 of the Restatement (p. 770) cites Doe v. Arguelles
and apparently assumes that Utah also adheres to § 319.
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It is respectfully submitted that the question
of the breach of the duty of care should be tried to the
Court and not summarily dismissed.
POINT THREE
THE STATE OF UTAH WAIVED THE PROVISIONS
OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BY
INSURING ITS SELF AGAINST LOSS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-26 and the succeeding
sections of Utah law have established a system whereby the
state and the various governmental

entities

may acquire

insurance and have established a "Risk Management Fund" which
is a form of self insurance (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-35).
The insurance premiums are obtained through the
assessment of taxes, the levy of which is not to exceed .0001
and through the investment of such monies so collected.

The

self insurance program utilizes tax monies and the interest
and investment proceeds and is administered by a private
trustee (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30 28). With the adoption of
the self insurance program a cap has been placed upon the
amount of any recovery against the governmental agency.
It appears that the enlightened thought as to whether
or not the obtaining of insurance and the utilization of tax
dollars to do so is that such actions create a waiver of the
governmental immunity imposed by the legislatures of the
various states.
This trend was pointed out in Schoeing v. United
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States Aviation Underwriters, 120 N.W.2d 859 (Minn., 1963)
wherein the Court observed:
"We are clearly of the view that where
a municipality expends public funds
for the purchase of liability insurance,
such expendature constitutes a waiver by
the municipality and its insurer to the
extent of the policy coverage."
To allow the governmental agency to acquire insurance
utilizing public monies and then assert governmental immunity
would be to make a gift of the public monies to the insurance
carrier.

LaMont Ind. Sch. Dist. #1-95 of Grant City v.

Swanson 549 P.2d 215, (Okla., 1976).
This trend can be followed from the Wyoming case of
Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339
(Wyo., 1974) and the Annotation of cases in 68 ALR2d 1437 and
71 ALR3d 6 § 25 when the up-dates are read show the trend of
the Courts around the United States with respect to this
matter.

It is conceded that the courts are sharply divided

and it is difficult to discern a majority view. Hinchey v.
Ogden, 307 S„E.2d 891 (Va., 1983).

Utah has not directly

ruled one way or the other.
It is respectfully submitted that dicta in Standiford
v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) would seem to
indicate the direction that the Court will go.

Justice

Stewart observed:
"Because the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act authorizes the procurance of governmental
insurance protection, the governmental entities
may sensibly budget to include insurance

-12-

premiums for tort claims arising out of the
operation of such things as public golf
courses."
In the matter now before the Court,

plaintiff, with

the permission of the Court, filed an amended complaint
alleging the existence of insurance in this matter.
Defendant's motion to dismiss in effect admits this
allegation, at for the purposes of the motion.

Petersen v.

Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 396 P.2d 748; Heathman v. Hatch, 13
Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990.
Colorado in Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo App.,
1984)

held that as the State had obtained insurance, the

State was liable for the murder of a man by a parolee as the
procurement constituted a waiver of governmental immunity.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that when the exemption
provision of Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 (j) is read as a single
phrase it is obvious that before the
within the perview of the exemption

act complained of falls
there must be a causal

connection between the act complained of and the incarceration
of a prisoner.
connection.

In the instant case there is no such causal

Clearly, under the law the State should answer

for the negligence of its employees and agency.

To spend

tax dollars on insurance coverage and then deny liability
under the governmental immunity act is to
public monies on a useless thing.

squander the

Certainly, the Utah

State Legislature did not intend such a result.
The ruling of the District Court dismissing
plaintiff's complaint should be reversed and this matter
remanded for trial on its merit.
ULLY SUBMITTED,

P"£U£ N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Appellant
Suite 280, 311 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*********

GEORGE "Nick" KIRK,
:

Civil No. CV-87873

Plaintiff,
-vs-

RULING

STATE OF UTAH, et al.

:

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendants.
*********

This matter came regularly before the court for hearing on
Thursday, August 13, 1987, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
based upon sovereign immunity pursuant to 63-30-1 et seq.
Paul N. Cotro-Manes esq. represented Plaintiff.
C. Fuller esq. represented Defendants.

Christopher

The Court, having

heard oral arguments of counsel in the premises, having read
the Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support of the Motion,
and the Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion, makes the
following Findings and Ruling:
FINDINGS
1.

On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt
Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie
Lee Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff
herein, in the stomach.

On January 12, 1987, Plaintiff filed this negligence action
against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of
Corrections.
On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
63-30-1 et seq.
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign
immunity for any injury resulting from the exercise of a
governmental function "except as otherwise provided in this
chapter," indicates an intention that the act be strictly
applied to preserve sovereign immunity.

Holt v. Utah State

Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973).
Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act
defines "Governmental function" as:
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a
government or government function, or could be performed
by private enterprise.
By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the
defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental
function within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that
2
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that such activity could be performed by private enterprise
does not alter that result.
7.

Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity
from suit for injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his
authority except for certain enumerated exceptions.

8.

One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if the
injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any
state prison . . ."

Section 63-30-10(1) (j) U.C.A 1953, as

amended; previously numbered as 63-30-10(10).
9.

The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative
intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries
occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison
and under the control of the state. Madsen v. State,
583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978).

10. The fact that ^inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to
the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court
proceedings does not change the fact that Gardner was
an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State Prison who
was under the control of the state.
11. The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is
expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of
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the .

.

. Act,"

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,

631 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added), and a waiver of that
immunity cannot be implied solely by the fact a state
has chosen to purchase insurance coverage.
12. This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh
doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his
remedy for actual injuries suffered.

The court further

acknowledges that, while several states are currently
restricting sovereign immunity, the State of Utah seems
to be reinforcing sovereign imminity.

However, this

court is not the appropriate forum to change the policy
of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court.
RULING
1.

Defendant's are immune from this suit pursuant to Section
63-30-10(1)(j) of the ,Utah State Governmental Immunity Act,

2.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this action is granted.

Dated this 4th day of November, 1987.
BY THE COURT

BOYD t .

PARK ^"DISTRICT JUDGE

c c : Paul N. Cotro-Manes e s q .
C h r i s t o p h e r C. F u l l e r e s q .
Brent A. Burnett, esa.
4
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ADDENDA

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
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ADDENDA

UTAH CODE ANN § 63-30-10

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the exclusive
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights.
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